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Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between credit risk and securitisation in the South 
African banking sector. Panel data analysis was used to analyse the annual observations from four major 
South African banks for a sample period from 2005 to 2014. Results indicate that the basis for 
securitisation variation in South African banks stems from capital, bank size and the economic growth 
of the country. A positive impact of securitisation on credit risk was discovered. The paper revealed 
that, contrary to previous findings, the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 had no effect on the 
securitisation in the South African banking sector. This paper also found that size has a significant 
influence on capitalisation. Compared to small banks, large banks tend to securitise more and take on 
further credit risk. Therefore, banks should increase or maintain an acceptable capital amount to hedge 
against any unexpected risks. Proper systems should be established and adopted to encourage 
repayment of loans by borrowers. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks are at the heart of every economy. Healthy and successful banks are vital for 
economic development, especially in a country such as South Africa. Nevertheless, 
there are a number of risks faced by banks, including credit risk (risk of repayment), 
market risk, operational risk, trade union risk, liquidity risk, interest risk, portfolio 
risk and legal risk. The most important of these risks is credit risk. Credit risk is one 
of the most significant risks for every bank. Credit risk is the inability of the borrower 
to repay the loan, combined with the bank's poor supervision over the credit granted. 
Credit risk is one of the causes of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and 
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consequent economic meltdown (Charles & Kenneth, 2013). Moreover, Chijoriga 
(1997) contends that the influence of credit risk is far greater, and capable of 
collapsing a whole bank, compared to the other risks faced by banks. As an attempt 
to hedge against credit risk and the future financial instability, most banks have 
increased their securitisation activities. Securitisation is the process that starts when 
an individual or a company approaches a bank for a loan, and the bank approves the 
loan, but incurs the cost and risk of non-payment by the borrower (Shenker & 
Colletta, 1991). In mitigation, banks group a number of loans together according to 
their different characteristics, and then pool these loans into different securities that 
can be sold on the open market (Shenker & Colletta, 1991). This securitisation is 
implemented to transfer the risk associated with these loans, and to protect the bank 
liquidity and profitability (Shenker & Colletta, 1991). 
The engagement of banks in the securitisation process lies in the three benefits 
associated with this process. The first benefit is the efficient source of funding by 
removing certain stocks (loans) from the bank's books and thereby realising more 
capital, reducing financing costs and improving capital requirements (Griffin,1997). 
The second one is the improved banks’ Statement of Financial Position, in which 
risky assets, including loans are removed from the banks’ statement of financial 
position (Liaw & Eastwood, 2000). This process tends to improve the financial, 
economic, and capital measures of the bank (Liaw & Eastwood, 2000). The third 
benefit of securitisation is related to the use of securitisation as a risk management 
tool (Davis, 2000). Among the risks faced by banks, credit risk is one of the risks 
directly related to the banks’ performance and profitability, and for this reason, banks 
take advantage of securitisation to provide the additional funding required to cover 
credit risk.  
The South African securitisation market has increased substantially since its first 
transaction in 1989. Due to misunderstanding of this new concept and lack of 
appreciation by banks, for a period of 12 years (1989–2001), certain restrictions were 
imposed by regulatory bodies to slow down the rapid development of securitisation 
in South Africa (Moyo & Firrer, 2008). Following the newly amended securitisation 
regulation in 2001, the securitisation market in South Africa started to grow 
significantly again. However, there is limited research on securitisation and credit 
risk in South Africa. This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature and 
empirical analysis by evaluating the relationship between securitisation and credit 
risk in the South African context. This paper follows the measures of credit risk used 
by Salah and Fedhila (2012), but utilises the relevant risk proxies and economic 
variables that represent the South African economic and financial landscape. 
 
2. Empirical Literature 
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A number of researchers (Aggarwal & Jacques, 2001; Casu, Girardone & Molyneux, 
2010; Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995; Pavel & Phillis, 1987; Pennacchi, 1988; Shrieves 
& Dahl, 1992; Uhde & Michalak, 2010) have studied the effects of, and relationship 
between securitisation and credit risk. From these studies, two conclusions regarding 
the relationship between securitisation and credit risk were reached. Some studies, 
i.e. Aggarwal & Jacques, 2001; Cabiles, 2011; Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995 and 
Loutskina, 2011, decided in favour of a positive relationship between securitisation 
and credit risk, whereas others, i.e. Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008, and Dionne and 
Harchaoui, 2003, concluded in favour of the negative relationship between 
securitisation and credit risk. 
Findings in favour of securitisation suggest that banks benefit by increasing the 
amount of loans provided and reducing their risk by partaking in securitisation. This 
implies that banks that securitise more loans are able to provide additional loans and 
funding. By separating the source of funding from the bank, the bank can reduce its 
credit risk and increase its loan provision, profitability and liquidity (Pavel & Phillis, 
1987; Pennacchi, 1988). A study by Demzetz (2000) focused on the diversification 
advantages associated with loan sales (securitisation) on the open market and found 
that diversifying the loan portfolio increases the ability to securitise more and 
provide more loans to customers. Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) also find that the 
securitisation process has a negative effect on the unsolvability of the United States 
(USA) of America’s banking sector. In the same vein, Casu et al. (2010) presented 
positive supporting evidence with regard to the stability effects of diversification on 
securitisation in the USA. One of the advantages of securitisation and credit risk is 
the fact that once the loans are no longer on the bank’s Statement of Financial 
Position, the bank is no longer required to carry the minimum capital requirements 
as set out by the regulations authority against that asset. This provides savings on the 
bank’s capital.  
By applying the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Krahnen and Wilde (2006) 
revealed that most European banks engaged in more risky assets after the 
announcement of securitisation, and this increased the credit risk due to unstable 
markets. Similarly, (Awdeh, El-Moussawi & Machrouh, 2011) find that adverse 
bank regulations affect the bank's credit risks and performance. Moreover, Baur and 
Joossens (2006) also find evidence that securitisation reduces a bank’s capital 
requirements, and this generally affects credit risk because it encourages banks to 
prioritise more profitable portfolios and riskier assets. Enforcing regulations, such as 
the capital requirements, increases the risk of a bank's failure and decreases the 
customer confidence in banks, which will affect the social repayment system and 
thereby increasing its credit risk (Kahane, 1977; Kohen & Santomero, 1980). 
In the South African context, studies have been done on securitisation and its 
development, and include those of Tensfeldt, Firer, & Bendixen, 1993; Saayman & 
Styger, 2003; Gumata & Mokoena, 2005; Karoly et al., 2006; White, 2011; Smit, 
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2012; and Terblanché, 2012. The findings of these studies reflect that securitisation 
in South Africa has not developed as much, compared to the securitisation in 
developed nations, such as the USA. However, the relationship exists and is 
significantly positive, meaning that South African banks use securitisation as a form 
of hedging strategy and for speculation purposes. These South African studies 
focused on the relationship between securitisation and liquidity risk, or mortgage-
backed securitisation. Therefore, this paper focuses on the relationship between 
credit risk and securitisation. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Description  
This paper used a quantitative research approach with panel data analysis. The 
annual secondary data from 2005 to 2014 was collected from the audited financial 
statements of the selected banks, available from the McGregor BFA database. The 
securitisation information was collected from the Banking Association of South 
Africa and the South African macroeconomic variables data was obtained from the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and Statistics, South Africa. The four major 
banks in South Africa namely, Absa Bank Ltd, FirstRand Bank Ltd, Nedbank Ltd 
and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd, were selected for this paper. These four big 
banks provide a fair representation of the banking sector in South Africa, and they 
had securitisation data available for the period of the study.   
3.2. Model Specification 
The model specification is to examine the allocation of assets between different 
categories of risks faced by a bank. A linear regression model with the independent 
variable of Risk-weighted Assets/Total Assets (RWATA) is used, while the Altman's 
Z-score Model will analyse the relationship between securitisation and bank 
stability.  
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖  + µ𝑡                   (1) 
Z-Score = 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖  + µ𝑡 (2) 
Where: RWATAit is the credit risk for bank i at period t, measured by the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets; SECTAit is the ratio of total securitised assets to 
total assets; X is the vector of the independent variables representing macroeconomic 
variables and specific control factors of bank i for the period t. Z-score measures the 
distance from insolvability, implying that the higher value of Z-Score indicates little 
default risk and ut is the error term. Although Z-Score has been used by different 
authors (Altman et al., 1995, p. 3; Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006: 314; Roy, 1952; Uhde 
& Heimeshoff, 2009; Boyd, Nicolo, & Jalal, 2006; Levy, Kanat, Kunin, Tooshknov 
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& Tzruya, 2014). This paper adapted the Z-Score models used by Salah and Fedhila 
(2012).  
Z − Score = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2+ 6.72X3  + 1.05X5      (3) 
Where:  
X1: Working capital/Total assets; 
X2: Retained earnings/Total assets; 
X3: EBIT/Total assets; and  
X4: Book value equity/Total liabilities. 
The coefficients in Altman's Z-score formula are standard numbers formulated by 
Altman to accommodate the manufacturers, non-manufacturer industrials, and 
emerging market credits. The diagram below summarises this classification. 
 
Figure 1. Z-Score classification areas 
In explaining the risk performance of banks, this paper considers four types of 
variables: securitisation activity (total securitised assets), variables of banks, the 
South African macroeconomic variables, and bank specific variables as control 
variables. These variables are summarised in Table 1. 
  
Insolvency Area GreyArea Low Risk Area
(High Risk of Bankruptcy) (Uncertain Results) (Healty) 
Z < 1.81 1.8 < Z > 2.99 Z > 2.99
Z-Score Cutoff
1.81 2.675 2.99
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Table 1. Definition of variables 
 
Variables 
Designatio
n 
Description 
Expecte
d effect 
on RC 
Dependen
t 
variables) 
Credit risk 
 
 
 
RWATA 
Risk weighted assets/ Total 
assets 
  
N/A 
Z-Score 
X1: Working capital/Total 
assets; X2: Retained 
earnings/Total assets; X3: 
EBIT/Total assets; X4: Book 
value equity/Total liabilities 
N/A 
Bank 
specific 
variables 
Securitisatio
n 
SECTA 
Securitisation assets/Total 
assets 
(+/-) 
Capital 
CAPTAL Equity capital/Total assets (+/-) 
ECRWA 
Equity capital/Risk weighted 
assets 
(+/-) 
Performance ROE Net income/Equity capital (-) 
Size LOGTA Logarithm of total assets (-) 
Macro-
economic 
variables 
GDP GDP 
A sustained increase in the 
trend level of either (a) 
aggregate production, or (b) 
per capita GDP 
(-) 
Ave CPI Ave CPI 
Inflation deflated by the 
Gross Domestic Product using 
CPI 
(+/-) 
Exchange 
rate 
EXCR 
Country's real exchange rate. 
(+/-) 
Subprime 
crisis 
Dummy for 
subprime 
crisis 
Dummy 
0 = Before or after the crisis 
and 1= during the crisis (+) 
3.3 Panel Root Unit Test and Cointegration 
As the first step in the estimation of the model, the panel unit root test is conducted 
to determine whether the variables are stationary or non-stationary. Unit root is used 
to establish the order of integration between variables, i.e. to check if the variables 
are stationary at level or integrated of order, I(0), and whether a variable is stationary 
at the first difference or integrated of order 1, I(1). This test is performed to prevent 
the use of non-stationary variables, which can result in a spurious regression (Brook, 
2014). Therefore, for the purpose of the panel unit root test, this paper used Levin, 
Lin & Chi (LLC), Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) and ADF Fisher Chi-square, and 
compared results to the results of these tests. If variables are stationary, then the 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 13, no 2, 2017 
 108 
normal panel regression is estimated. However, if variables are non-stationary, then 
a cointegration test is conducted to see if the linear combination of these variables is 
stationary. 
A panel cointegration model is used to check if there is a long-run or short-run effect 
between the variables (Brooks, 2014:373–379). The common panel cointegration 
model includes the Pedroni (Engle-Granger) and Kao cointegration model (Brooks, 
2014). The first model is a less restrictive method of testing for cointegration, and is 
therefore used in this study to conduct the panel cointegration tests, and the Kao 
cointegration model is used to confirm the Pedroni model results. If both tests 
confirm that variables are cointegrated, then the cointegrating model, Fully-
Modified OLS model (FMOLS), can be estimated and the results interpreted. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
This paper approximates the securitisation activity (SECTA) by using the total 
securitised assets to total assets. Dionne & Harchaoui, 2003, and Casu et al., 2010, 
used this method. Previous studies found that the relationship between securitisation 
and credit risk could either be positive or negative (Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995; 
Wagner, 2007). The paper will also use ECRWA and CAPTL. ECRWA being equity 
capital to risk-weighted assets and CAPTL, the capital per total assets. This paper 
used both (ECRWA) equity capital to risk-weighted assets and the capital per total 
assets (CAPTL) as the measures of capital. Return on equity (ROE) will be used to 
measure performance, while bank size is represented by the natural logarithm of total 
assets (LOGTA). This paper uses , macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), Ave CPI and exchange rate will be employed to measure country 
economic growth, the level of inflation and the currency fluctuation, respectively. 
Lastly, Control Variable (used as a dummy variable) will be used to account for the 
instability of the global financial system caused by the 2007–2009 subprime crisis. 
In analysis, the control variable (dummy) is denoted by 1 during the crisis period 
from 2007–2009 and 0 before 2005–2006 and after 2010–2014. 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents information about the descriptive statistics of both the dependent 
variable and the independent variables. From the table, we observe that the Z-Score, 
meaning the distance from solvency in the sample, has a mean of 2.8541 and the 
standard deviation of 3.6786.This indicates that small banks or banks with small 
market power present lower solvency compared to big banks. The reason for this is 
that bigger banks tend to securitise more because they have more capital and market 
power. This also correlates to the theory of Altman and Hotchkiss (2006); according 
to their studies, a Z-Score ranking above 2.99 is in the healthy safe risk area. 
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Therefore, this means that the sample banks perform well in terms of the Z-Score 
classification.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Z-
Score 
RWAT
A 
SECT
A 
CAPTA
L 
ECRW
A 
LOGT
A 
GDP 
Ave 
CPI 
EXC
R 
Dumm
y 
 Mean 2.8541 0.4591 0.0001 0.0767 0.3962 20.4930 0.0301 0.0555 
-
0.0173 
0.3000 
 Median 2.8559 0.4950 0.0001 0.0779 0.1584 20.4642 0.0310 0.0576 
-
0.0335 
0.0000 
 Maximum 12.5492 0.6887 0.0002 0.0933 2.7973 21.3666 0.0560 0.1004 0.1230 1.0000 
 Minimum -7.4862 0.0328 0.0000 0.0529 0.1043 19.6799 
-
0.0150 
0.0206 
-
0.1040 
0.0000 
 Std. Dev. 3.6787 0.1772 0.0000 0.0111 0.6748 0.4006 0.0207 0.0212 0.0698 0.4641 
 
Probability 
0.4022 0.0001 0.2936 0.3611 0.0000 0.7212 0.2715 0.5665 0.1496 0.0220 
                      
 Sum 
114.164
7 
18.3636 0.0029 3.0686 15.8473 
819.718
2 
1.2040 2.2212 
-
0.6920 
12.000
0 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
3.6786 1.2240 0.0000 0.0048 17.7577 6.2602 0.0167 0.0175 0.1899 8.4000 
 
Observatio
ns 
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Furthermore, by analysing the total assets allocation to different risk categories from 
Table 2, this work observes RWATA and identifies that it has a mean of 0.4591 and 
a standard deviation of 1.2240. This indicates that, on average, only 45.91% of the 
banks ‘total assets are exposed to all the risk faced by the bank. With only almost 
46% of the bank’s assets exposed to different risk. This places banks in the right 
position to hedge against soft and hard risk in the industry, and leaves room for 
growth in the bank's books.  
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
A common assumption is that there is an existence of multicollinearity among 
variables if the correlation coefficient is higher than 0.8 (Kervin, 1992; Gujarati, 
2009; Jurczyk, 2011, p. 262; Studenmund, 2011, p. 258). From the correlation 
analysis in Table 3, this work observes that only RWATA and ECRWA have the 
coefficient of -0.9023, which is above the norm. Due to the strong correlation 
between RWATA and ECRWA, these variables cannot be included in the same 
model. It is observed that other independent variables are weakly correlated, and this 
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allows us to exclude the possibility of overlapping this variable’s significance in a 
multivariate model. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
Correlat
ion  
Coeffici
ent  
Z-
Score 
RWA
TA 
SECT
A 
CAPTA
L 
ECRW
A 
LOGT
A 
GDP 
Ave 
CPI 
EXC
R 
Z - 
Score  1.0000                 
RWAT
A  
-
0.1539 1.0000               
Prob. 0.3430 -----                
SECTA  
-
0.0860 0.3497 1.0000             
Prob. 0.5978 0.0270 -----              
CAPTA
L  0.3913 0.0021 
-
0.2571 1.0000           
Prob. 0.0125 0.9897 0.1093 -----            
ECRW
A  0.2250 -0.9023 
-
0.4040 0.1670 1.0000         
Prob. 0.1627 0.0000 0.0097 0.3031 -----          
LOGTA 
-
0.0537 -0.2025 0.1963 0.2205 0.0020 1.0000       
Prob. 0.7419 0.2101 0.2247 0.1716 0.9902 -----        
GDP 0.3071 0.0478 0.2039 -0.4676 -0.0121 -0.3829 1.0000     
Prob. 0.0539 0.7695 0.2069 0.0023 0.9407 0.0147 -----      
Ave CPI  
-
0.1538 -0.0378 
-
0.2102 0.0552 0.0019 0.3609 
-
0.4835 1.0000   
Prob. 0.3435 0.8168 0.1930 0.7350 0.9909 0.0221 0.0016 -----    
EXCR  
-
0.3975 0.1018 0.1423 -0.1439 -0.1483 -0.1554 
-
0.2258 
-
0.3956 
1.000
0 
Prob. 0.0111 0.5321 0.3809 0.3759 0.3609 0.3384 0.1612 0.0115 -----  
DUMM
Y 
-
0.3482 0.0565 
-
0.0304 -0.4708 -0.1165 0.0026 
-
0.2063 0.7101 
-
0.028
8 
Prob. 0.0277 0.7289 0.8523 0.0022 0.4739 0.9873 0.2015 0.0000 
0.859
9 
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4.3. Regression Analysis 
4.3.1. Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
Using the Levin, Lin & Chi (LLC) (2002); Im, Pesaran; Shin (IPS) (2003) and 
ADF Fisher Chi-square (ADF Fisher) unit root tests, the following hypotheses 
apply: 
Null hypothesis (𝐻0): panel data has unit root 
Alternative hypothesis (𝐻1): panel data has no unit root (stationary). 
The unit root results are summarised in Table 4. The panel unit root test results for 
Z-Score, ROE, GDP and EXCR reveals that at level, the LLC model’s p-value is less 
than 0.05, and therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. While the Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat method and ADF-Fisher Chi-square method p-values are greater than 
5%, meaning that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This implies that when the 
models present mixed results; the decision is made by choosing the one with majority 
results. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 0.05 significance level, 
implying that Z-Score, ROE, GDP and EXCR have a unit root at level and are 
therefore not stationary. This result leads to further tests for stationarity at first 
difference. When Z-Score, ROE, GDP and EXCR are converted to the 1st difference, 
all three methods’ (LLC, IPS and ADF) p-values at 1st difference are less than 0.05. 
The null hypothesis is therefore rejected at 0.05  significance level, since all models’ 
p-values are significant at first difference,  compared to level. Then, the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, meaning that Z- Score, ROE, GDP and EXCR are stationary 
at 1st difference or I(1). 
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Table 4. Panel unit root tests 
 
Unit root test for SECTA, CAPTAL, and CRWA reveals that at level all three 
models’ p-values are greater than 5%, meaning the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
and that SECTA, CAPTAL, and CRWA have a unit root at level. However, when 
converted to 1st difference, all three methods’ (LLC, IPS and ADF) p-values at 1st 
difference are less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at 0.05 
significance level, as all models’ p-values are significant at 1st difference, compared 
to level. The alternative hypothesis is then accepted, meaning that SECTA, 
CAPTAL, and CRWA are also stationary at 1st difference or I(1). Lastly, LOGTA 
and AVE CPI reveal that at level, all three models (LLC, IPS and ADF) methods’ p-
value is less than 0.05 and therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and LOGTA and 
AVE CPI are found to be stationary at level or I(0). 
4.3.2. Analysis of the Long-Run Relationship 
Since all variables are integrated of I(1), with an exception for LOGTA and AVE 
CPI, which are both integrated at I(0) and I(1), the cointegration test was used to test 
for the existence of the long-run relationship. The hypothesis test for cointegration 
is set as follows: 
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H0: there is no cointegration between variables.  
H1: there is cointegration between variables. 
Using the Pedroni cointegration test, only six variables are allowed to be tested, as 
presented in table 5. First, without trend, second, with trend and intercept (but could 
not formulate results due to fewer observations), and last, with no intercept or trend. 
Therefore, only Z-Score, SECTA RWATA, ROE, LOGTA, EXCR and ECRWA 
were tested.  
Table 5. Pedroni cointegration results 
 P-value P-value 
Common AR coefs. (within-dimension)   
Panel v-Statistic 0.9931 0.9869 
Panel rho-Statistic 0.9906 0.9910 
Panel PP-Statistic 0.0000 0.2290 
Panel ADF-Statistic 0.0001 0.3951 
Weighted Statistic   
Panel v-Statistic 0.9817 0.9855 
Panel rho-Statistic 0.9936 0.9875 
Panel PP-Statistic 0.0000 0.8317 
Panel ADF-Statistic 0.0153 0.7776 
Individual AR coefs. (between-dimension)   
Group rho-Statistic 0.9995 0.9994 
Group PP-Statistic 0.0000 0.6117 
Group ADF-Statistic 0.0137 0.8373 
The Pedroni cointegration results in table 5 reveal that data, with no deterministic 
trend, six tests out of eleven are significant. This means that the decision is based on 
the majority results, and therefore the Null Hypothesis: no cointegration test is 
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis: cointegration is accepted. However, when 
interception and trend are removed, none of the results is significant, and therefore 
this study cannot reject the Null Hypothesis: no cointegration. Using the Pedroni 
Residual Cointegration Test, we have tested a limited number of variables, which 
also gives this study mixed results, and therefore, the study can use the Kao 
cointegration test. This method allows us to test all the variables. The results of this 
test are presented in table 6. 
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Table 6. Kao cointegration results 
ADF 
t-Statistic Prob. 
-2.198783 0.0139 
Residual variance 5.056800  
HAC variance 1.930092  
According to the Kao cointegration test, all variables are significant at 0.139, which 
is less than 0.05, meaning that we can reject the Null Hypothesis: no cointegration, 
and accept the alternative hypothesis: there is cointegration among variables, 
meaning that they have a long-run relationship. Therefore, from the Pedroni 
cointegration test and Kao cointegration test, it can be concluded that the variable is 
cointegrated and then the cointegrating model, the Fully-Modified OLS model 
(FMOLS), is estimated.  
4.3.3. Regression Output Analysis  
Due to the high correlation between the variables, namely, RWATA and ECRWA. 
The regression results omitted ECRWA for both Z-Score and RWATA models.  
Table 7. Regression output (Altman’s Z-Score model and RWATA model) 
Model 
variables 
Z-Score model RWATA model 
 Coefficien
t 
t-Statistic Prob. Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
RWATA -2.663044 -1.120955 0.2718    
SECTA 2776.553 0.288005 0.7755 1558.383 2.363045 0.0250 
LOGTA -1.326942 -4.234481 0.0002 -0.021702 -0.936611 0.3567 
CAPTAL 275.8296 5.162268 0.0000 6.019909 1.558962 0.1299 
EXCR -2.411420 -0.298163 0.7678 1.117668 1.899739 0.0675 
GDP 60.70279 1.706786 0.0989 5.216535 2.055060 0.0490 
Ave CPI 1.847546 0.053586 0.9576 4.703387 1.919339 0.0648 
ROE 45.12035 3.915898 0.0005 -0.436309 -0.520645 0.6066 
R2 = 0.748572 and 0.938781 for Z-Score and RWATA respectively.  
4.4. Discussion of Results  
The regression results in Table 7 reflect that the R-squared for both models are higher 
with values of 0.748572 for Z-Score and 0.9387810 for RWATA respectively; the 
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implication is that 74.86% variation in Z-Score is explained by the combination of 
the independent variables. Likewise, 93.87% variation in RWATA is explained by 
its independent variables.  
The bigger the bank, the more credit risk it can take. Holding other things constant, 
this work expects the relationship between the bank's size and credit risk to be 
positive because of the bank's economies of scale, studies by Alexiou and Sofoklis 
(2009) and Iannotta et al., (2007) support this view). However, according to table 7, 
the bank size (LOGTA) results indicate an inverse relationship to Z-Score, with the 
coefficient of -1.326942 units. The implication is that the bigger the bank, the lower 
the securitisation ratio and risk-weighted assets. This demonstrates a non-linear 
effect on size (Athanasoglou et al., 2008, p. 133). This also aligns to the view that 
small banks can realise scale efficiency. The second variable capital coefficient 
(CAPTAL) exhibits a positive relationship with the Z-Score model, and is 
statistically significant at 5%, with the value of 275.8296 units, and not statistically 
significant for the Z-Score model. The implication is that if the banks’ capital 
increases by 1%, the Z-Score will increase by 275.8296 units. These findings refer 
to Berger (1995, p. l435), who points out that banks with capital below the set bank's 
equilibrium ratio, may experience relatively high bankruptcy costs. Likewise, 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis (2008, p. 129) assert that the positive relationship 
may be due to the capital function as a security and safety box for unexpected 
developments, such as credit risk. However, higher capital increases profitability, 
and this will offset the equity costs, which gives the bank the ability to provide more 
loans and thereby increase securitisation, but hedging the risks with the large capital 
reserves (García-Herrero, Gavilá, & Santabárbara, 2009, p. 2082). Finally, banks 
have a minimum capital requirement to hold against the risk-weighted assets as set 
out by the Basel Accord (Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi, 2007, p. 2127).  
One of the vital and significant variables under the Z-Score and RWATA is the 
economic growth (GDP), with the positive relationship with the Z-Score and RWAT, 
the coefficients are 112.8191 units and 5.216535 units, respectively. The implication 
is that as the economic growth increases by 60.70279 units, the Z-Score will also be 
increased by 60.70279 units, while RWATA will increase by 5.216535 units. 
Generally, poor economic conditions have a negative effect on the bank’s loan 
portfolio, causing credit loss and increasing capital reserves to be held by the bank. 
In contrast, improvement in economic growth, borrower’s efficiency and solvency 
improve the loan (credit) demand, and this has a positive effect on the bank's 
bankruptcy position and lowers credit risk (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Instejford 
(2005) and Wagner (2007) assert that higher capital, combined with a booming 
economy, reduces the credit risk on the bank's books. However, this risk reduction 
creates possibilities for the bank to take on more risk. Studies observing the 
economic growth effect on the bank's credit risk include Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Bikker & Hu, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000; and Dietrich & Wanzenried, 
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2011. Likewise, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009, p. 395) found that the economic 
cycle affects the interest rate income and loan provisions.  
The securitisation coefficient (SECTA) exhibits a positive relationship with the 
RWATA model, with the value of 1558.383. This means that if securitisation 
increases by 1558.383, RWATA will also increase by 1558.383 units. This supports 
the findings of Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), which mention that more securitisation 
leads to more funding options and more capital reserves.  
In addition, the coefficient of the exchange rate and inflation (CPI) exhibits a positive 
relationship with the RWATA model, with coefficient values of 1.117668 and 
4.703387 units, respectively. This indicates that an increase in the exchange rate and 
CPI will increase RWATA by 1.117668 units for exchange rate and 4.703387 units 
for CPI units. This represents a linear relationship between RWATA and exchange 
rate and inflation. Revell (1979), who found that inflation affects borrowers’ salaries 
and bank costs, introduced the relationship between inflation, credit risk, and 
profitability. Similarly, Perry (199, p. 26) states that the effect of inflation is 
dependent on the anticipation level. If fully anticipated, both banks and households 
are able to adjust their resources. Further studies on inflation effects include those of 
Alexiou & Sofoklis, 2009; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; García-Herreto et al., 2009; 
Kasman, Tunc, Vardar, & Okan, 2010 and Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007. 
The final observation from these results is that return on equity (ROE) is also the 
significant variable to explain the variations in the Z-Score model, with the 
coefficient value of 45.12035 units. The implication of this is that a combination of 
capital and good economic conditions, which direct us to a proper policy 
coordination, will improve South African credit risk and the securitisation market.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This paper has empirically investigated the relationship between securitisation and 
credit risk in South Africa. A pooled analysis, using the panel data analysis of four 
major banks in South Africa, was tested for the period, 2005 to 2014. Two 
regressions were performed; first, to analysis the relationship between securitisation 
and bank stability, using the Altman’s Z-Score model, and second, allocation of 
assets between different categories of risks faced by a bank. The regression results 
reveal that capital and economic growth are both significant when explaining the 
relationship between securitisation and credit risk. For the second regression, bank 
size and capital are significant when explaining the contribution to the allocation of 
banks’ assets in different risk categories.  
The results reveal that there is an increase in credit risk when banks securitise more 
loans. Moreover, the size of the bank plays an important role in securitisation, credit 
risk taking and risk-weighted assets kept by the bank. The implication of this is that 
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the bank size explains the increase in securitisation and risk taking by banks. This 
supports the study of size-credit risk relevant hypothesis. In general, the results from 
both regressions reflect that capital influences securitisation positively and 
eventually affects the South African banking stability positively. This means that the 
South African banking system is still sound and healthy because of its good and 
strong capital structure and banking regulations.  
In light of these findings, the following recommendations are made: banks should 
increase or maintain an acceptable level of capital to hedge against any unexpected 
risks. Proper systems should be established to encourage the repayment of loans by 
borrowers, and proper policy coordination by policy authorities should play a key 
role in limiting credit risk, securitisation and solvency risk. During the course of this 
paper, the following topics were identified for future research on the topic: 
 The effects of macroeconomics on credit risk; 
 Securitisation effects on credit risk: the use of credit spreads; 
 Credit risk and liquidity risk: the case of South Africa; 
 Contemporary credit risk modelling: a guideline for South African banks. 
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